Richmond Public Interest Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 3

Article 4

4-29-2018

The Nature of the Judicial Process: A Complex
Systems Analysis of Checks & Balances &
Separation of Powers in the Present Political
Context
Marvin L. Astrada

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr
Part of the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
Recommended Citation
Marvin L. Astrada, The Nature of the Judicial Process: A Complex Systems Analysis of Checks & Balances & Separation of Powers in the
Present Political Context, 21 Rich. Pub. Int. L. Rev. 263 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol21/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Richmond Public Interest Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Astrada: The Nature of the Judicial Process: A Complex Systems Analysis of
Do Not Delete

4/29/18 8:45 AM

THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: A COMPLEX
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF CHECKS & BALANCES &
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL
CONTEXT
Marvin L. Astrada, JD, PhD*

* Marvin L. Astrada has completed an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics and International Relations at Florida International University, and a JD at Rutgers University Law School. His graduate and legal studies and research
have focused on law and society, judicial politics, US politics, and foreign
policy. Presently, he teaches politics in the Politics & History Dept. at New
York University—Washington DC. Previously, he served as Research Scientist with the Applied Research Center at Florida International University,
where he was responsible for the FIUARC/U.S. Government Strategic Cultures Project. Dr. Astrada has taught introductory and advanced courses in
politics, law, and international relations, has presented his research at professional conferences, and has published in the fields of law and society and
international relations.
263

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017

1

Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
Do Not Delete

264

4/29/18 8:45 AM

RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI:iii

ABSTRACT
Justice Cardozo’s prescient inquiry in The Nature of the Judicial
Process nearly a century ago merits revisiting and analysis in light of the
present political climate. Under the new administration, the Executive
Branch has characterized a judicial opinion from the U.S. District Court of
Hawaii’s as emanating from “an island in the Pacific,” suggested the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals should be fragmented, and subjected judges who
disagree with the constitutionality of the administration’s immigration
policies to ridicule, vilification, or disparagement. When contemplating the
nature of the judicial process, it is time to reassess the courts' systemic
policymaking function in the constitutional system via checks and balances
and separation of powers. This article, therefore, analyzes the principles of
checks and balances, separation of powers, and the policymaking courts
through the lens of complex systems analysis.
The complex and systemic interactions between the courts, Congress, and
the Executive Branch give rise to an intricate sociopolitical, legal, and
economic system. In the present political context, a complex systems
analysis reveals that the courts’ power to check, balance, and maintain the
separation of powers is a legitimate and necessary exercise within the
constitutional schema. Here, complex systems analysis is employed to
explore how courts are acting properly when reviewing, checking, and
balancing the power of the competing branches. Further, this analytical
approach re-conceptualizes “judicial activism” as constitutional
interpretation explicitly reflecting the policymaking role of the courts and
their work to preserve the integrity of the constitutional system. From this
perspective, the role of the courts can be viewed as policymaking not from
any particular ideological position, but rather from the structural systemic
values and norms that bind the constitutional order.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution is complex, because it functions as a text,
legal ordering mechanism, expression of an historical moment, repository
of ideology, and philosophy of government and governance. In its original
and amended form, the Constitution sets out the structure of the federal

https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol21/iss3/4

2

Astrada: The Nature of the Judicial Process: A Complex Systems Analysis of
Do Not Delete

2018]

4/29/18 8:45 AM

NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

265

government,1 defines the authority of the federal and state governments,2
and puts forth sundry constraints on the exercise of federal power.3 The
Constitution also describes the relationship between the federal government, state governments, and all persons subject to their respective jurisdictions.4 Additionally, the plasticity of the text raises several issues that pave
the way for the courts' interpretive enterprise of “finding” constitutional
“truths,” and applying those truths to the U.S. polity.5 In 1921, Benjamin
Cardozo asked, “Where does the judge find the law which he embodies in
his judgment? . . . There are gaps to be filled. There are doubts and ambiguities to be cleared. There are hardships and wrongs to be mitigated if not
avoided.”6
Today, the Executive Branch is impinging upon the Judiciary's complex
role of finding the law. Namely, the current Executive has sought to minimize and circumvent the Judiciary’s power to check, balance, and uphold
separation of powers.7 Recently, the Executive characterized the U.S. District Court of Hawaii’s judicial decree on the President's Executive Order
banning immigration from several Muslim-majority countries as emanating
from “an island in the Pacific.”8 Further, the Executive called for the fragmentation of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and ridiculed, vilified, and
disparaged its judges that disagreed with the Administration’s immigration
policies. With this in mind, it is timely to revisit the nature of the judicial
9

1

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also id. at art. II § 1, cl. 1; id. at art. III, § 1.
See id. at pmbl.; see also id. at art. IV § 4.
3
See id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see also id. at art. II § 3; id. § 1.
4
See id. at art. IV, § 1; see also id. § 2, cl. 1; id. § 4.
5
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803) (“The question whether a right has vested or
not, is, in its nature, judicial.”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14
(1921).
6
CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 14.
7
E.g., Evan Perez & Jeremy Diamond, Trump Fires Acting AG After She Declines to Defend Travel
Ban, CNN (Jan. 31, 2017, 2:37 PM), www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/donald-trump-immigrationorder-department-of-justice/ (discussing the blocking of implementation of President Trump’s executive
order on curbing immigration via a travel ban on targeted countries and then-acting Attorney General
being relieved of her position after questioning the constitutionality of the president’s immigration executive orders); see Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Allows Parts of Travel Ban to Take Effect, CNN
(June
27,
2017,
3:11
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/26/politics/travel-ban-supremecourt/index.html; see also Christian Farias, Court Temporarily Blocks Parts of Trump’s Syrian Refugee
POST
(Jan.
29,
2017,
9:09
PM),
and
Travel
Ban,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/court-blocks-trump-refugee-ban_us_588d4b53e4b0b065cbbc6a6f.
8
Charlie Savage, Jeff Sessions Dismisses Hawaii as ‘an Island in the Pacific’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/us/politics/jeff-sessions-judge-hawaii-pacific-island.html.
9
See Amber Phillips, Trump Keeps Throwing Shade on the 9th Circuit. But He Probably Won’t Be Able
to Break It Up., WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/04/28/can-trump-absolutely-break-up-a-federal-court-thats-standing-in-hisway/?utm_term=.93040a9f30a6; see also Andrew Kaczynski, AG Sessions Says He’s ‘Amazed’ a Judge
‘On an Island in the Pacific’ Can Block Trump’s Immigration Order, CNN (Apr. 21, 2017, 11:30 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/politics/kfile-sessions-psychoanalyze/index.html; Jose A. DelReal &
2
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process and its policymaking function in the American constitutional system.10
Additionally, it is timely to reevaluate the commonly accepted notion
that public policy of the government is to be found in its statutes, and when
they have not directly spoken, then in the decisions of the courts and in the
constant practice of the government officials; but when the lawmaking
power speaks upon a particular subject, over which it has constitutional
power to legislate, public policy in such a case is what the statute enacts.11
Furthermore, it may no longer behoove federal courts to declare courts
can know nothing of public policy except from the Constitution and the
laws, and the course of administration and decision. It has no legislative
powers. It cannot amend or modify any legislative acts. It cannot examine
questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or impolitic. Considerations of that sort must, in general, be addressed to the legislature. Questions
of policy determined there are concluded here.12
Because the present Administration has shown a lack of respect for
checks and balances and the separation of powers, it is time for honest judicial opinions that embrace rather than eschew the systemic policymaking
function of the courts.13
In analyzing the role of judicial opinions as policy statements, and the
power of the courts to check and balance as well as maintain separation of
powers, it is important to appreciate “the role of law as a broker between
the past and the future of social orders and the social functions of legal doctrine.”14 Since the Constitution’s inception as a meta-signifier (meaninggranting) and signified (meaning-receiving) document, various actors have
Katie Zezima, Trump’s Personal, Racially Tinged Attacks on Federal Judge Alarm Legal Experts,
WASH. POST (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2016/06/01/437ccae6-280b11e6-a3c4-0724e8e24f3f_story.html?utm_term=.95110959e31d; Olivia B. Waxman, The History Behind President Trump’s Problem with the Ninth Circuit Court, TIME (Apr. 27, 2017),
http://time.com/4758187/donald-trump-ninth-circuit-history/.
10
See Jeffrey Toobin, The Courts and President Trump’s Words, NEW YORKER (Mar. 17, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-courts-and-president-trumps-words.
11
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1896).
12
License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 469 (1867).
13
See Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50
(1976); Chris Cillizza, Trump’s Russia Statement Proves He Doesn’t Understand Separation of Powers,
CNN (Aug. 2, 2017, 4:40
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/02/politics/trump-russiasanctions/index.html (discussing President Trump’s lack of understanding of checks and balances and
separation of powers in his tweets stating “the opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes
law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!” and “just cannot believe
a judge would put our country in such peril. If something happens blame him and court system. People
pouring in. Bad!”).
14
Paulo Barrozo, The Great Alliance: History, Reason, and Will in Modern Law, 78 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 235, 242 (2015); see also CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 81.
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put forth competing interpretations of the actual meaning and purpose of the
Constitution.15 The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches, as well as
State governments have each vied for the power to expound constitutional
truth at some point in the Constitution’s history.16 However, the federal
courts have predominately produced a distinct constitutional discourse that
proffers what has become accepted as the correct interpretation of the Constitution.17 The evolution of constitutional meaning, the nature of the judicial process, and the role of courts—particularly, the U.S. Supreme Court—
in shaping such meaning can be viewed from a systemic perspective. That
is, the Constitution lays out a complex system wherein interpretation and
meaning are situated and inform the nature of the judicial process. Furthermore, a systems analysis provides overarching coherence for judgment and
principles of interpretation that orient the courts' role and power in regard to
the other branches of government. What is more, the systemic and structural
underpinnings of the order established in the original text of the Constitution and its amendments enshrine public policy prerogatives in the form of
checks and balances ("CAB") and the separation of powers ("SOP") that
serve to contour the interpretive enterprise.
In light of the impact that the Constitution has on defining political, social, and economic realities in the U.S., this article examines the interpretive
enterprise in the present political context using complex systems theory
analysis. This analysis reveals the courts' inherent, legitimate, and necessary
power to check, balance, and maintain the separation of powers, because
complex systems “involve many components that adapt or learn as they interact [and] are at the heart of important contemporary problems.”18 In turn,
judicial activism can be re-conceptualized as a form of constitutional interpretation that reflects the policymaking role of the courts. Further, CAB and
SOP provide courts with “principles of selection . . . to guide [courts]
among all the potential judgments that compete for recognition[,]” because
15
See Winton U. Solberg, True Meaning: The Federalist and the Constitution, 16 REV. IN AM. HIST. 368
(1988).
16
See, e.g., Brian M. Feldman, Note, Evaluating Public Endorsement of the Weak and Strong Forms of
Judicial Supremacy, 89 Vᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 979, 980 (2003); see also Paul E. McGreal, Ambition’s Playground,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1117–19 (2000).
17
See Feldman, supra note 16, at 980–83; see also Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The
Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
239–41 (2002).
18
John H. Holland, Studying Complex Adaptive Systems, 19 J. SYS. SCI. & COMPLEXITY 1 (2006); see,
e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (ruling that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment may not be used in state law criminal prosecutions in state courts or federal criminal law
prosecutions in federal courts through selective incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (ruling unanimously that the states are
required under the Sixth Amendment to provide counsel in criminal cases for indigent defendants
through selective incorporation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
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“[e]very judgment has a generative power. It begets in its own image.”19
The courts’ power to effectuate “presumably desirable social objectives can
. . . be reached through a departure from traditional modes of decision[,] but
is not free from difficulty.”20 Because judicial opinions are a form of policymaking, this article asserts that a complex systems analysis addresses this
difficulty.
Part I discusses complex systems theory as an analytical tool for examining the Constitution and the role of the Judiciary. Part II then explores judicial policymaking within the Constitution's complex system via checks and
balances. Finally, part III explores the Judiciary's role within the system visà-vis the other political branches, and ultimately concludes that the Judiciary functions not only to uphold the constitutional order founded on CAB
and SOP, but also to actively participate within it.
I. APPLYING THE COMPLEX SYSTEMS APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
A. Constitutional Interpretation as Public Policy
The Constitution and its interpretation by the courts can be viewed as the
expression of public policy pronouncements that the Founders believed
should form the perpetual basis of the republic.21 Policy can be defined as
government pronouncements backed by the financial and coercive power of
the state to effectuate an interpretation of the social welfare.22 Policy entails
a multi-agent generated process wherein the social welfare is conceptualized, defined, and acted upon.23 Within this process, policy can be viewed as
“considerations of what is expedient for the community,” according to Justice Holmes.24 Policy has “consistently, if not always explicitly, found authority in peoples’ empirical perspectives about social consequences. Its
most important contribution has perhaps been . . . that law is most fruitfully
conceived as decision in the sense of sanctioned authoritative choice.”25
19

CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 21.
Charles B. Nutting, Policy Making by the Supreme Court, 9 U. PITT. L. REV. 59, 72 (1947).
21
See Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern
Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2000).
22
See Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 298
(1972).
23
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, 35–36 (Paulo J.S. Pereira & Diego M. Beltran eds., 2011) (1881).
24
Id. at 35.
25
Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362,
372 (1971).
20
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Policy is affected within the system and structure of the constitutional order, and the law, as policy, is no exception.26
The Constitution embodies a complex system within which public policy
and social welfare are articulated and implemented. Philip Kurland writes,
[The] Constitution itself [is] an expression of public policy. Just as with law . . .
public policy may be divided into the two categories of the substantive and the
procedural. And when one looks at the text of the Constitution, it is readily apparent that the public policy expressed in it [as originally conceived] is essentially procedural rather than substantive.27

Yet the courts have found substance within procedure, and have interpreted the Constitution as policy accordingly, substantively and procedurally.28 “We reach the land of mystery when constitution and statute are silent,”29 Cardozo explains. It is in this space that systemic structural policy
principles come into play when interpreting the Constitution. As the Court
noted early on in its jurisprudence, “It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”30 Expansively viewing
policymaking, the Court’s assertion is explicitly policy-based. That is, the
federal courts’ assumption of the power to participate substantively in the
tripartite order established by the Constitution is part of a complex system
premised on enduring structural values of order and stability reflected in the
cardinal principles of CAB and SOP. The foregoing are key systemic principles that factor into the courts' interpretive calculus.
B. Complex Systems Theory as an Analytical Tool
On its face, systems analysis may seem too overly broad to produce clear
conclusions about the nature of judicial interpretation and opinions. Indeed,
because it is a natural scientific theory, it may appear as though it does not
readily apply to the sociality of human affairs.31 However, as an analytical
26

See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 10 (discussing how judges used President Trump’s campaign language to
create the policy justification for overturning an executive order that would not have been overturned if
issued by President Obama).
27
Philip B. Kurland, Public Policy, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, 12 N. KY. L. REV. 181,
182 (1985).
28
Id. at 183 ("The lion’s share of the substantive policy-making function in the national government was
assigned to the legislative branch, largely by article I, § 8, although provision was made for recommendations to the legislature by the President in article II. There is no suggestion of a policy-making function for the judicial branch at all."). But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that
the Constitution implies a fundamental right to privacy, and, thus, developing a distinct jurisprudence
that confers a substantive dimension to the procedural constitution through opinions).
29
CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 18.
30
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
31
See, e.g., Stephen Wolfram, Complex Systems Theory (Princeton Inst. for Advanced Stud. 1985),
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framework and worldview, complex systems analysis does not necessarily
fall into this explanatory quagmire despite no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a complex system.32 Theorists have generally described complex systems as comprised of “systems that have a large number of components, often called agents, [which] interact and adapt or
learn.”33 This basic description of complex systems informs the nature of the
judicial process and policymaking in the constitutional order. As a complex
system, agents or participants in the system are affected by interpretation of
the Constitution’s provisions by the Judiciary either within the judicial process or as an effect of judicial policymaking. Thus, it is fruitful to explore
the notion that the courts possess policymaking capacity within the complex, constitutional system. For example, constitutional interpretations from
the Judiciary inform how the U.S. conducts domestic affairs and implements foreign policy, which in turn affects the domestic polity and foreign
policy.34
Additionally, systems analysis provides a way of evaluating interpretive
outcomes in a constitutional context where "causation is complex."35 David
Byrne observes, "Outcomes are determined not by single causes but by
multiple causes, and the causes may, and usually do, interact, in a nonadditive fashion. [T]he combined effect is not necessarily the sum of the
separate effects.”36 Furthermore, a systems analysis provides insight into
constitutional order because
system boundaries . . . are multiple, fluid and massively entangled, the ‘internal
interactions’ happen at various scales and interlocking patterns emerge at various places across the system and throughout the time period of the selforganizing process. Clusters of agents form micro-patterns continually. The micro-patterns interact to form larger, more comprehensive patterns or disrupt
each other during the on-going evolution of the system. At the same time,
emergent patterns in a super-system influence the emerging patterns in sub-

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/academic/complex-systems-theory.pdf.
32
See Holland, supra note 18, at 6.
33
Id.
34
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding foreign terrorism suspects held at Guantanamo Bay have the constitutional right to challenge their detention in federal courts); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding military commissions set up by the Administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay are unconstitutional because they do not afford Geneva Convention and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice protections); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding federal
courts have authority to determine if foreign nationals held at Guantanamo Bay were wrongfully imprisoned); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding detainees at Guantanamo Bay that are US citizens must be accorded rights of due process and the ability to challenge their enemy combatant status
before an impartial authority).
35
DAVID BYRNE, COMPLEXITY THEORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: AN INTRODUCTION 20 (Routledge,
1998).
36
Id.
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systems and in individual agents by either reinforcing or disrupting their local
self-organizing process.37

As Bela Banathy notes, “system” refers to a configuration of individual
parts connected and joined together by a web of interdependent relationships as “elements in standing relationship.”38 In general, a system is thus
composed of regularly interacting parts that give rise to systemic concepts
and principles that impact the whole system and other individual actors
within it.39 These concepts, whether political, legal, or philosophical, work
in tandem within the system of organizational relationships, and develop the
system’s “capacity to unify and rationalize.”40 As systemic or structural
concepts, CAB and SOP facilitate agent engagement within the constitutional order by enhancing the courts’ capacity to unify and rationalize constitutional jurisprudence to preserve the integrity of the system as a whole.
In this way, as expressions of policy, court opinions serve the system by
maintaining the independence and interdependence of the three branches
using CAB and SOP.
Further, a systems perspective helps to contextualize complex judicial interpretation as the Judiciary works to maintain the integrity of the overarching constitutional order as a whole despite being one of its key actors. A
systems analysis enables clearer examination of cardinal constitutional concepts, as well as their philosophical implications and logical conclusions.41
A complex systems perspective provides additional insight into the judicial
role and power in that systems can be defined in objective and subjective
terms:
Subjectively, complex systems involve ‘unfamiliar . . . or unplanned and unexpected sequences, either not visible or not immediately comprehensible’. In
this respect, complexity tends to be identified by its relationships rather than by
its constituent parts. Such distinction between objective and subjective definitions implies that: (i) complex systems are not uniform—there are relationships
of differing strengths between their components (and those with especially tight
connections form sub-systems); and (ii) any components in the system can participate in multiple sub-systems—so even ‘homogeneous components can support internal diversity through re-alignments of relationships to create nonidentical sub-subsystems.’42

37

Kai E. Lehmann, Unfinished Transformation: The Three Phases of Complexity’s Emergence into International Relations & Foreign Policy, 47 COOPERATION & CONFLICT 407 (2012).
38
Bela Banathy, A Taste of Systemics, PRIMER PROJECT AT INT'L SOC'Y FOR THE SYS. SCI.,
http://www.isss.org/taste.html.
39
Id.
40
CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 31.
41
Id. at 37.
42
Emilian Kavalski, The Fifth Debate and the Emergence of Complex International Relations Theory:
Notes on the Application of Complexity Theory to the Study of International Life, 20 CAMBRIDGE REV.
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Systems analysis posits that individual agents are the collective base elements of the system that interact and adapt to interactions, which allows
for innovation and maximization of the potential for the individual parts to
evolve. 43 It is important to underscore, as John H. Holland clarifies, that a
complex system
has no single governing equation, or rule, that controls the system. Instead, it
has many distributed, interacting parts, with little or nothing in the way of a
central control. Each of the parts is governed by its own rules. Each of these
rules may participate in influencing an outcome, and each may influence the
actions of other parts. The resulting rule-based structure becomes grist for the
evolutionary procedures that enable the system to adapt to its surroundings.44

Thus, one can conceptualize a complex system as a “learning machine,
one made up of semi-independent modules which work together to solve a
problem."45 Howard Bloom continues, "Some complex adaptive systems,
like rain forests, are biological. Others, like human economies, are social. . .
. Both apply an algorithm—a working rule” that sets the foundation for interaction. In this case, that algorithm includes CAB and SOP.
46

Accordingly, complex systems are “complex,” because they are composites of diverse, interconnected parts, which adapt and learn through interaction with other parts.47 Agents adapt to the shifting dynamics characteristic
of a networked and integrated system.48 In the same way, judges adapt new
ways of administering and interpreting the law within the constitutional system. Thus, the multifarious nature of constitutional interpretation finds
footing on algorithms and stabilizing principles such as CAB and SOP.50
49

OF INT’L AFF. 436, 438

(2007).
Id.
44
See John H. Holland, Complex Adaptive Systems, 121 DAEDALUS 1, 21–22 (1992); see e.g., D&W
Auto Supply v. Kentucky Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 422 (Ky. 1980) (challenging the constitutionality of the Litter Control Act, and holding that the Act is an appropriation act and, thus, is unconstitutional for failure to have received a vote of majority of all members elected to the House of Representatives); Consumer Party of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 507 A.2d 323, 331–32 (1986), overruled by Pa. Against
Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 877 A.2d 383 (2005) (holding that a party challenging
the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly bears a heavy burden of proof, and legislation
will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution).
45
See e.g., HOWARD K. BLOOM, GLOBAL BRAIN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MASS MIND FROM THE BIG
BANG TO THE 21 CENTURY 9 (2000); Holland, supra note 44, 17–18.
46
BLOOM, supra note 45, 9–10; Holland, supra note 44, 17–18.
47
BLOOM, supra note 45, 9–10; Holland, supra note 44, 17–18.
48
Holland, supra note 44, 17–18.
49
See Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961, 996–97
(1978); see also David H. Freedman, Is Management Still a Science?, HARVARD BUS. REV. (1999),
https://hbr.org/1992/11/is-management-still-a-science.
50
See Carla Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and the
Rise in Targeted Killing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 595, 604 (2013); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube.
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
43

ST
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Consequently, the Constitution, and the Judiciary's interaction with it, reflects a complex system via CAB and SOP.51
C. Analyzing Constitutional Interpretation Using Complex Systems Theory
Based on the above analysis, our understanding of the Constitution is
helped by identifying the structural factors or principles that inform the interpretive enterprise. 52 In this way, structural principles provide us with a
way to analyze further the work of the courts using the complex systems
model to observe which factors are at play in the interpretive calculus.53 For
example, we can observe which principles courts choose to apply to facilitate the administration of justice within CAB and SOP.54 From this perspective, courts use the Constitution to derive law even though the text itself
functions as both a meaning-maker and a meaning-receiver. 55
Here, complexity does not refer to the level of complication that underlies the systems analysis, but rather refers to the idea that “systems are
composed of numerous interconnected components, or agents, dynamically
interacting with one another, as well as with other external systems.”56 The
Judiciary’s is just one agent within the constitutional system, but it affects
the balance of power among the other Branches and the States.57 Complexity involves discrete actors interacting within the constitutional order.58
Meanwhile, reductionism minimizes this complexity by focusing on the
components as the primary means of generating an accurate explanation of
constitutional meaning.59 Reductionism distorts the complexity of the system.60 For example, a reductionist might concentrate exclusively on the Judiciary’s discourse, but ignore its role within CAB and SOP more broadly.61
In that way, system “‘behavior cannot be understood by decomposing the
system into parts,’ because ‘the actions of any single part of the system can
only be understood with reference to the entire system.’”62

51

Crandall, supra note 50, at 604.
Id.
53
Id.; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube. Co., 343 U.S. at 634–55.
54
See Crandall, supra note 50; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube. Co., 343 U.S. at 634–55.
55
Id.
56
See Crandall, supra note 50, at 609.
57
See id.
58
See id. at 604.
59
See id.
60
Id.
61
See Crandall, supra note 50, at 604.
62
Id.; see CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 42 (observing the role of philosophy and principles in jurisprudence can also be applied to the systemic distribution of power and justifications for a perpetual constitutional order: “in the end, the principle that was thought to be most fundamental [by the courts], to rep52
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Additionally, complex systems analysis also adds value to the interpretive enterprise by taking into account adaptability.63 In their nature, complex
systems exhibit discernible patterns of adaptation.64 An agent within a complex system gathers “information about its surroundings and its own behavior.” This process enables agents to learn, evolve, adapt, or reorganize according to the challenges that arise within the system.66 “Agents within
systems, and even the systems themselves, constantly trend toward what
theorists term self-organization,” Crandall explains.67 As Lars Skyttner observes, self-organization “may be regarded as a theory about the way chaotic systems organize themselves and attain order. [For example] . . . changing technological development, changing lifestyles and preferences, [and]
immigration” law reflect different notions of systemic organization.68 The
courts have therefore developed several adaptive judicial mechanisms, such
as balancing tests, adhering to precedent, and relying on first-principles.69
The Judiciary's ability to self-organize puts forth jurisprudence designed to
order, secure, and stabilize the polity within constitutional law.70
65

resent the larger and deeper social interests, put its competitors to flight.”).
63
Crandall, supra note 50, at 606.
64
Id.; see generally Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a Strategic
National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 611 (2001) (The “separation of powers scheme created by
the Founders established an institutional interdependence among the branches that allows for the possibility that the Court might be a protector of the rules of the game without producing a substantial counter-majoritarian effect. This institutional structure anticipates the possibility of differences in preferences, thereby producing a check on elected officials, but also creates institutional incentives to diminish
the antidemocratic effects of those differences.”).
65
THE MIND, THE BRAIN & COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 12 (Harold Morowitz & Jerome Singer eds.,
1995).
66
See Brian T. Goldman, The Switch in Time That Saved Nine: A Study of Justice Owen Roberts’s Vote
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, C. UNDERGRADUATE RES. ELEC. J. (2012),
http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/150 (analyzing and illustrating the notion of system agents’ adaptive
learning).
67
Crandall, supra note 50, at 642; see Kai E. Lehmann, Crisis Foreign Policy as a Process of SelfOrganization, 24 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT’L AFF. 27–42 (2011).
68
LARS SKYTTNER, GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY: PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVE, PRACTICE 296, 297–300
(2d ed. 2006).
69
See D.C. v. Heller, 552 U.S. 570, 589–620 (2008) (illustrating the reliance on first-principles of law,
here the Second Amendment, to strike down a municipal ban on handguns as violating the second
amendment, and therefore interpreting the amendment as the drafters of the Constitution had intended,
securing an “individual right to bear arms for defensive purposes.”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (illustrating the use of stare decisis to uphold past precedent as still controlling, therefore rejecting to overrule established precedent); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (illustrating
the use of a balancing test as a judicial mechanism to organize a complex judicial standard).
70
See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015) (discussing the debate of how to interpret the Constitution through a positivist framework, specifically focusing on
originalism); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINNESOTA L. REV.
1173 (2005) (discussing the relationship between the rule of law and the doctrine of stare decisis); Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585 (1988) (discussing the judicial mechanism
of balancing tests including its origin, how they work, why they became so popular, and an evaluation of
their use); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal
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At the systems level, the Judiciary plays a cardinal role in defining and
contextualizing constitutional order.71 In so doing, the courts both impact
and are impacted by multi-dimensional layers of legal, sociopolitical, and
economic sub-systems (e.g., commerce, national security, criminal justice,
welfare, property, and international law).72 The courts’ adaptability, then,
reflects a deep philosophical and historical commitment to CAB and SOP
as each provides the foundation for the interpretive enterprise.73 When considering the systemic nature of CAB and SOP, Justice Holmes’ observation
in N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner that, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic,” readily applies.74 The wealth of information that judges employ to adjudicate constitutional issues, such as precedent, balancing tests, and other
principles, can be located within the firmament of CAB and SOP, and create a pervasive conceptual “complex bundle” that “loom[s] above all others."75 The philosophical and historical bases of the Constitution enshrine
CAB and SOP, and the Judiciary incorporates these into its meaningmaking and policymaking enterprises.76 The Founders subscribed to the notion that
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 J. OF CONST. L. 155 (2006) (discussing the role
of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication and what it means for originalists and the future of unenumerated rights).
71
CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 48 (On the load-bearing constitutional structures of checks and balances
and separation of powers, Cardozo writes, “These fundamental conceptions once attained form the starting point from which are derived new consequences, which, at first tentative and groping, gain by reiteration a new permanence and certainty. In the end, they become accepted themselves as fundamental and
axiomatic.”).
72
See id. at 51–66; Crandall, supra note 50, 608–611; Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and
Strategies, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 276–278 (1986); Robert C. Tucker, Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society, 88 POL. SCI. Q. 175–176 (1973).
73
CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 55 (writing that these fundamental provisions “have come to us from without not from within, that they embody the thought, not so much of the present as of the past, that separated from their past their form and meaning are unintelligible and arbitrary, and hence that their development, in order to be truly logical, must be mindful of their origins.”); see also Tucker, supra note 72,
at 173–190.
74
N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
75
See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2076 (2016) (“Under its commerce power, this
Court has held, Congress may regulate, among other things, activities that have a substantial aggregate
effect on interstate commerce."); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17–22 (2005) (holding so long as those
activities are economic in nature, one such “class of activities” is the production, possession, and distribution of controlled substances. Grafting the holding in Raich onto the Hobbs Act’s commerce element,
it follows that a robber who affects even the intrastate sale of marijuana affects commerce over which
the United States has jurisdiction.”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124–125 (1942) (including “purely local activities that are part of an economic
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce”); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 was constitutional); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273–275 (1918) (finding that federal
regulation of child labor in purely internal (within a state) manufacturing, the products of which will not
enter interstate commerce, to be beyond the power of Congress to regulate); CARDOZO, supra note 5, at
65.
76
CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 17–28, 65.
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the best legislators of all ages agree in this, that the absolute power, which originally is in the whole body, is a trust too great to be committed to any man or
assembly; and therefore . . . it will be an eternal rule in politics among every
free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every state
within itself. . . . [T]he best government is that which consists of three forms,
regis [King], optimatium et populi imperitum [nobles, people]. . . . It is manifest that the best form of government is that which is compounded of all three.
This is founded not only in reason, but in experience.77

The nature of the judicial process and Constitutional interpretation, thus,
reflects a systemic policymaking paradigm that encapsulates the systems'
agents (i.e., the Judiciary, Legislature, and Executive) and their relationship
to the overarching constitutional order.78
Because public policy must align with the Constitution, CAB and SOP
impact the form and substance of judicial policymaking.79 For example,
constitutional jurisprudence is permeated with generalities (e.g., fundamental rights or due process of law) to ensure broad and uniform application.80
This application requires the courts to work according to the core principles
of the Constitution, like CAB and SOP.81 As noted in Green v. Frazier,
“What is meant by due process of law this court has had frequent occasion
to consider, and has always declined to give a precise meaning, preferring
to leave its scope to judicial decisions when cases from time to time arise.”82
In Twining v. New Jersey, the Court notes that the Judiciary “has never attempted to define with precision the words ‘due process of law.’ . . . It is
77

Gilbert Chinard, Polybius and the American Constitution, 1 J. OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 42–44
(1940) (observing that the “vice of kingly government is monarchy; that of aristocracy, oligarchy; that of
democracy, rage and violence; into which, in process of time, all of them must degenerate. Lycurgus, to
avoid these inconveniences, formed his government not of one sort, but united in one all the advantages
and properties of the best governments; to the end that no branch of it, by swelling beyond its due
bounds, might degenerate into the vice which is congenial to it; and that, while each of them were mutually acted upon by opposite powers, no one part might incline any way, or outweigh the rest; but that the
commonwealth being equally poised and balanced, like a ship ‘or a wagon,’ acted upon by contrary
powers, might long remain in the same situation; while the king was restrained from excess by the fear
of the people, who had a proper share in the commonwealth; and, on the other side, the people did not
dare to disregard the king, from their fear of the senate, who, being all elected for their virtue, would
always incline to the justest side; by which means, that branch which happened to be oppressed became
always superior, and, by the accessional weight of the senate, outbalanced the other."); see also Swidler,
supra note 72, at 273–286, 276–277; GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND
UNDERSTANDING (1971).
78
See CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 17, 28, 65; see also Chinard, supra note 77, at 42–44; Crandall, supra
note 50, at 608–611.
79
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. at 340 (holding public policy of the government is found in
its statutes, therefore public policy must conform to the Constitution because statutes must also conform
to the Constitution).
80
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
81
See id.
82
Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238 (1920).
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sufficient to say that there are certain immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union
may disregard.”83 Fundamentally, CAB and SOP are immutable principles
that structure the complex system in which the Constitution operates.84 Upon this foundation, the courts' role, therefore, serves as a systemic “paramount public policy, one that will prevail over temporary inconvenience or
occasional hardship, not lightly to sacrifice certainty and uniformity and order and coherence.”85
II. JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING & ACTIVISM WITHIN A COMPLEX SYSTEM
A. Judiciary as Policymakers
Federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular, continue to bestride the nebulous area between political and apolitical institutions.86 The
Court is
a political institution, an institution, that is to say, for arriving at decisions on
controversial questions of national policy. As a political institution, the Court is
highly unusual, not least because Americans are not quite willing to accept the
fact that it is a political institution and not quite capable of denying it; so that
frequently we take both positions at once.87

Generally speaking, debate has coalesced around two broad views when
analyzing the courts as a policymaker.88 The first view argues that federal
courts should have “an important and active role in national policy making,” in order to provide “the vindication of the constitutional rights of deprived and downtrodden groups and the representation of the politically
weak in the political system as well as the checking of the excesses of the
elective branches of government.”89 The second view contends that the
courts are “ineffectual in the formulation of national policies and cautions
83

Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78, 101–02 (1908).
See Epstein et al., supra note 64.
85
CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 67.
86
See Michael Combs, The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker: A Historical-Legal Analysis of
School Desegregation, 8 S. U. L. REV. 197 (1981).
87
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,
50 EMORY L. J. 563 (2001); see also Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, a Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625 (2000).
88
See Combs, supra note 86.
89
Id. at 197–198; see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991))
(“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”).
84
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against the Supreme Court assuming a prominent and active role in national
policy-making.”90 Additionally, “When the Court does seek to play a major
role in national policy formulation,” it is “usurping the prerogatives of the
elective branches of government and . . . is outside of its area of competence.”91 The Judiciary's role of maintaining CAB and SOP, thus, merits
reexamination in light of the Trump Administration’s agenda to dismantle
the administrative state and ignore the courts as independent and legitimate
actors on the political and policy stages.92
As Andrew Siegel notes, “legal academics have done a poor job acknowledging, let alone analyzing, many of the specific practices, arrangements, and habits of thought that shape the content of constitutional law in
early twenty-first-century America.”93 Part of the problem is that there remains a persistent aversion to characterizing judicial interpretation and
opinions as a form of policymaking.94 However, “judicial judgments, and
certainly those that changed existing rules are, in fact, expressions of public
policy.”95 Policymaking functions on several different planes as it reflects
values, goals, interests, politics, history, and culture.96 At the same time,
philosophically and conceptually, policy reflects the purpose and meaning
of being a member of a political unit and forming a political identity.97 As
such, public policy is not “the rules of governance for our society but [rather it is] the ambience within which those rules are to be made.”98 Here,
“ambience” is the complex system upon which the constitutional order is
based, within which the courts are situated, and which breathes life into the
courts.99 From this perspective, policymaking is less a question of, for example, whether abortion is “right” or “wrong,” or if corporations should be
afforded speech rights, or if marijuana should be subject to federal classification and regulation, but more of an affirmation of the courts' power to
90

Combs, supra note 86, at 197.
Id. at 197–198.
92
See Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608–09 (1903) (“While the courts must exercise a judgment of their
own, it by no means is true that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree.
Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of view, as well as for possible peculiar conditions
which this court can know but imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise a constitution, instead of embodying only
relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities,
would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions, which by no means are
held semper ubique et ab omnibus.”).
93
Andrew M. Siegel, Constitutional Theory, Constitutional Culture, 18 U. PA . J. CONST. L. 1069 (2016).
94
See Kurland, supra note 27.
95
See id. at 185.
96
See EUGENE BARDACH & ERIC M. PATASHNIK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 8 (5th ed.
2016).
97
See id. at 9.
98
Kurland, supra note 27, at 190.
99
Id.
91
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ballast the constitutional order. As Justice Frankfurter observed, “A court is
confined within the bounds of a particular record. Only fragments of a social problem are seen through the narrow windows of a litigation.”100
Policymaking embodies identity formation while it preserves, enhances,
or augments the power to classify and define legal and political actuality.
As the structural ambience that anchors the constitutional order, policymaking also dismantles identity as it reconfigures social functions and redefines
social welfare.101 Some of the Supreme Court’s “landmark cases” illustrate
this point, such as: Shelley v. Kraemer,102 Brown v. Board of Education,103
Roe v. Wade,104 Miranda v. Arizona,105 Hernandez v. Texas,106 and Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.107 These cases and others demonstrate how the Court’s interpretations constitute policymaking from a systems perspective.108 Ignoring the systemic policymaking role of the courts
treats “constitutional practices as aspects of an underlying constitutional
‘structure’ . . . [and] makes them appear to be permanent, timeless, inherent
features of American constitutionalism.” This apolitical, de-contextualized
approach to constitutional interpretation feeds the illusion that the courts
possess knowledge based on a form of objective legal reasoning that is divorced from the Judiciary's powerful political and pragmatic policy-based
reasoning.110 Subsequently, interpretations avoid being classified as policy,
109

100

Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 344, 365–366 (1948); see, e.g., Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 1.
See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit the prosecution of a conspiracy in federal
court under federal law when that same conspiracy has already resulted in a conviction in state court
under state law); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (holding that a defendant can be acquitted of a
federal crime and convicted of a state crime, even if those crimes share the same evidence, without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which enabled state and federal prosecutions for substantially similar events).
102
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding courts may not enforce restrictive racial covenants for real estate).
103
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding segregating schools by race violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
104
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional laws that restrict a woman’s right to
an abortion prior to fetal viability).
105
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding police must advise criminal suspects of their
rights under the Constitution to remain silent, consult an attorney, and have legal representation appointed if indigent).
106
See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (holding that trying a defendant particular race or ethnicity in front of a jury where all persons of his race or ethnicity have been excluded by the state violates
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
107
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding political campaign contributions by corporations and labor unions constitute speech protected by the Constitution).
108
See Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 793
(1957); see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
109
Siegel, supra note 93, at 1070.
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103–04 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing how the develop101

110

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017

17

Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
Do Not Delete

280

4/29/18 8:45 AM

RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI:iii

which, as this article argues, is what they are when viewed systemically.111
As Justice Jackson observes, “Nearly every significant decision of the Supreme Court has to do with power—power of government, power of officials—and hence it is always concerned with the social and economic interests involved in the allocation, denial, or recognition of power.”112
Incidentally, despite its immense policymaking power, the judiciary rarely relies upon public policy as an explicit reason for its constitutional interpretations.113 It is not enough to say simply that ‘public policy’ justifies the
result. There are a thousand different public policies of variant strengths
that might be asserted. The specific policy must be identified and its relevancy made clear. Simply stated, neither precedent nor policy
genuinely
114
justifies a result except as its own basis affords the justification. Judicial
tools for interpretation, such as textualism, original intent, history, and balancing tests, can be viewed as both products and producers of the complex
system that informs the judicial process.115 Phillip Bobbitt’s taxonomy on
the “proper” modalities that interpretation, theory, and law can “legitimately” draw upon (i.e., history, text, structure, doctrine, ethos, and prudence)
provides a vivid example of how politically, socially, and ideologically
based interpretations are part of an overarching system that is greater than
the sum of its parts.116 But these modalities do not function in a vacuum:
these modalities are all part of a system.117
As a complex system, the Constitution as a blueprint for political order
influences judicial interpretation, which creates policies that promote cognitive maps to orientate a legal subject.118 In turn, this grants the legal subject
possibilities of thought and action so that it can develop an identity and be
emplaced in legal actuality.119 The deployment of cognitive maps through
constitutional interpretation establishes what Michael Shapiro has termed
ment of law is innately contextual).
111
See ROBERT JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 315–16 (1941).
112
Id. at xii; see also ROBERT J. MCKEEVER, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: A POLITICAL AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2016).
113
See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 721, 723 (1979).
114
Id.; see also Missouri, Kansas, & Texas. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (discussing the
importance of administering constitutional provisions with caution); Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby
Movement, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 158-60 (2014); MELANI MCALISTER, EPIC ENCOUNTERS: CULTURE,
MEDIA, & U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1945-2000 4 (Earl Lewis et. al. eds., 2001).
115
See generally Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 592 (discussing how checks and balances and the separation of powers, as systemic variables, embody as well as contour the policymaking capacity of the
federal courts, and the Court in particular).
116
See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 696 (1980).
117
See Vicente Abad Santos, The Role of the Judiciary in Policy Formulation, 41 PHIL. L. J. 567, 573
(1966).
118
See id.
119
Id.
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“moral geographies.”120 Moral geographies are “cultural and social practices
that work together to mark not only states but also regions, cultural groupings, and ethnic or racial territories. Moral geographies shape human understanding of the world. . . . Different moral geographies can coexist and even
compete.”121 Constitutional interpretation provides moral geographies in relation to the law. The Court’s interpretation of the Constitution—from
Bowers v. Hardwick122 to Obergefell v. Hodges,123 for instance—is a manner
of concretizing moral geographies for comprehending legal actuality.124 As
policy, interpretations of the Constitution retain high degrees of continuity,
but also can accommodate changes.125 For example, in Plessy v. Ferguson,
the Court's establishment of “separate but equal” doctrine directly contributed to a national policy of a white-nationalist morality and racial superiority preserved via segregation.126 However, the Court later rejected this via desegregation as national policy in Brown v. Board of Education.127
As policy, judicial opinions are part of “an interlocking system of practices, institutional arrangements, norms, and habits of thought that determine what questions we ask, what arguments we credit, how we process
disputes, and how we resolve those disputes.”128 The practices identified by
Bobbitt above, for instance, inform the cognitive maps that courts employ
and policymakers confront when engaging the constitutional text and its interpretations.129 In light of the forgoing discussion and analysis, complex
120
Michael J. Shapiro, Moral Geographies and the Ethics of Post-Sovereignty, 6 PUB. CULTURE 479,
482 (1994).
121
MCALISTER, supra note 114.
122
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding a
state constitutional amendment that denies equal protection of the laws to homosexuals is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(holding state law that criminalizes consensual same-sex sexual conduct violates right to privacy under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors because of
sexual orientation violates Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
123
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
124
Kurland, supra note 27, at 197; see, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Mapp, 367 U.S.
at 643.
125
See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“Even if
there is no negligence. . .public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent to defective products that reach the market.”).
126
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Berea
Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Cumming v. Richmond Cty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
127
Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
128
Siegel, supra note 93, at 1107.
129
See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L. J. 657, 678 (2009); Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Originalism as Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545,
546-48 (2006); Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L. J. 1195, 1203
(2009); Michael J. Shapiro, On Pictures, Paintings, Power and the Political Philosophy of International
Rights, THEORY TALKS (2009), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155097/Theory%20Talk36_Shapiro.pdf.
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systems analysis, thus, provides a theoretical lens to better explain court
power, because it highlights the Judiciary's policymaking power in the context of CAB and SOP while considering the current political climate
through adaptability.130
Accordingly, the myth of the apolitical Judiciary needs reassessment, especially given the demands being placed on the courts to counter what
many commentators feel are direct attacks by the Executive on the integrity
of CAB and SOP as envisioned in the Constitution.131 Plus, this analysis,
which counters the myth of the apolitical and reactionary as opposed to
proactive policymaker, conceptualizes judicial policymaking as a systemic
mandate geared toward preserving the integrity of the constitutional order
via CAB and SOP.132 As Nutting explains, “If we include in the term ‘policy’ the views of the justices as to the social, political or economic desirability of a given course of action, it is clear that the [C]ourt has always made
policy in some types of cases.”133 Justice Holmes acknowledges the Court’s
policymaking power stating, “I recognize without hesitation that judges do
and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined
from molar to molecular motions.”134 In sum, an candid appraisal or declaration of judicial power based on complex systems analysis may help to counter attacks on the integrity of the judiciary from the present Executive’s policies that threaten to undermine the integrity of CAB and SOP.135
B. Judicial Activism as Policymaking
Judicial activism can be re-conceptualized as a facet of systemic constitutional order that acknowledges the Judiciary as a check and balance in the
overarching political system, and not merely a passive bystander.136 The fear
of concentrated power in any one branch of government is an essential
theme throughout the Constitution.137 As James Madison notes, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judicia[l] in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self130

Greene, supra note 129, at 678; see e.g., Holland, supra note 18; Wolfram, supra note 31.
See, e.g., Jonathan Bernstein, A Lawless Presidency Isn't Without Its Risks, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jul.
26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-26/a-lawless-presidency-isn-t-without-itsrisks.
132
Holland, supra note 18, at 1; Wolfram, supra note 31.
133
Nutting, supra note 20, at 60.
134
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 2015, 218 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
135
Bernstein, supra note 131; Holland, supra note 18, at 1; Wolfram, supra note 31.
136
CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 23 (“The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in the end
be guided by like considerations for the one as for the other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits
of his competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He
fills the open spaces in the law.”).
137
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. at art. II, § 1; id. at art. III, § 1.
131
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appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”138 However, if policymaking, which the Constitution largely reserves
for the Legislative and Executive Branches, is tied directly to the courts acting to preserve CAB and SOP, then the courts may assert their legitimate
role in the policymaking process.139 Judicial review of Executive and Legislative pronouncements and the courts’ ability to set and revisit precedent are
examples of the judiciary’s role in the systemic administration of justice via
CAB and SOP.140 Ultimately, as Spann explains, “the distinction between
constitutional law and ordinary politics becomes untenable. Once scrutinized, the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence appears not only to
consist largely of political policy preferences but also to consist largely of
the political policy preferences that are favored by a majority of the
Court.”141
Despite being constitutional gatekeepers, the Judiciary’s policies must
still contend with being balanced and checked by the other branches of government. 142 Cardozo observes, “The judge, even when he is free, is still not
wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant
roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty and goodness he is to
draw his inspiration from consecrated principles.”143 In developing its constitutional jurisprudence, the Court notes the tension between the separation
of powers and how it competes with the Court's role as an enforcer checks
and balances.144 Focusing on the overarching system within which the Judiciary functions illuminates its policymaking character by going beyond specific social and ideologically-based polices, and instead highlighting the
structural norms, values, and ordering principles that the courts are reifying.
“The Founders’ formation of coequal branches of government—the executive, legislative, and judicial—equal in their responsibilities under the Constitution and laws of the United States and in their accountability to the
American people, is the rock upon which the world's longest-standing democracy rests.”145 Thus, CAB and SOP are intricately woven into the constitutional system and are the principles that contextualize the administration
of justice.

138

The Federalist Nos. 10, 47, 51 (James Madison).
Kurland, supra note 27, at 183–84, 186, 188–89.
140
Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 592.
141
Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutionalization, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 709, 710 (2005).
142
Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 592.
143
Cardozo, supra note 5, at 141.
144
See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining that when the
Court acts as policymaker, “at the expense of the legislature,” then the Court exercises “ultimate power
over public policy in fields where no specific provision of the constitution limits legislative power.”).
145
Dennis C. Hayes, Checks and Balances, 96 Judicature 148 (2013).
139
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When the courts promulgate social welfare policy, such as establishing
or undermining abortion rights,146 or bolstering corporate speech rights,147
they still rely on the larger constitutional “ambience” to justify and legitimize their enterprise. At the systems level, the process by which the courts
infuse the Constitution with social issues—and vice versa—can be viewed
as being informed by and reifying CAB and SOP.149 The courts “choose
among controversial alternatives of public policy by appealing to at least
some criteria of acceptability on questions of fact and value that cannot be
found in or deduced from precedent, statute, and Constitution. It is in this
sense that the Court is a national policy-maker.”150 CAB and SOP inform
criteria of acceptable policymaking by the courts, because these principles
are vital to the preservation of the constitutional order.151
148

III. JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING WITHIN THE THREE-BRANCH SYSTEM
A. Ordering Principles and the Constitutional Super-Structure
In a complex system, court-constructed standards, tests, principles, culture, and politics play a significant role in how interpretation is conducted
and the resultant policy that emerges in the form of opinions.152 Opinions, as
expression of public policy (e.g., gay marriage,153 corporate personhood,154
free speech,155 and religious freedom156), are built upon the structural principles that inform the constitutional order. The constitutional system is a
product of the three principal agents, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
Branches, and their interaction. Subsequently, each influences the others’
perceptions, interests, and conduct within the system. The Judiciary functions within a system that “is not only ‘complex’ in a descriptive sense but a
157

146

Spann, supra note 141, at 727–28.
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771 (1978).
148
See Spann, supra note 141, at 710.
149
See id. at 715.
150
Dahl, supra note 87, at 565.
151
See Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 592.
152
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (holding that the fact of respondent’s forcible abduction by U.S. government agents did not prohibit being put on trial in federal
court for violations of U.S. criminal laws). See also Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886) (finding
that a fugitive kidnapped from abroad could not claim any violation of the U.S. Constitution, laws, or
treaties).
153
See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2584.
154
See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
155
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
156
See, e.g., Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971 (2010).
157
See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 9–10
(2002).
147
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‘complex adaptive system’ . . . defined . . . as ‘a collection of semiautonomous agents with the freedom to act in unpredictable ways and
whose interactions over time and space generate system-wide patterns.’”158
The present constitutional order is the product of complex, integrative conduct that connects the individual agents.159 The degree of connectivity is
based upon the nature and intensity of interaction among the agents based
upon overarching ordering principles that guide relations and conduct.160
Each Branch “learns” from interaction because the degree of sophistication
and complexity that supports the constitutional order.161
As such, the Judiciary wove CAB and SOP into its jurisprudence and into the structure of constitutional order early on and throughout its history.162
For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court expounds upon constitutional meaning using the text and structure of the Constitution while looking beyond the text to clarify more than just the power of Congress to establish a bank and Maryland’s inability to tax it.163 The Court relies on CAB
and SOP to find in favor of the federal government and to pursue a profederal power agenda, which is a policy that emanates from the bench during Chief Justice Marshall’s tenure.164 The Court’s “opinion read the words
‘necessary and proper’ to mean not required and authorized but only reasonable and relevant, i.e., necessary = reasonable, proper = relevant: a more
potent formula than E=mc .” Examples of modern iterations of the Court’s
policy of bolstering the constitutional order via CAB and SOP include INS
v. Chadha,166 Bowsher v. Synar,167 and Mistretta v. United States.168
2

165

158

Lehmann, supra note 67, at 504.
Id.
160
Id.
161
See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Twelve Steps to Restore Checks and Balances in Democracy & Justice, in
COLLECTED WRITINGS 84 (Brennan Ctr. for Just., 2008).
162
See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Marbury,
5 U.S. at 137; see also Spann, supra note 141, at 719. See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656
(2004) (invalidating the Child Online Protection Act on First Amendment grounds); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (protecting nude dancing under the First Amendment); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (ruling flag burning is protected speech under the First Amendment);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976) (holding the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits racially disparate impact not directly caused by intentional discrimination);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of capital punishment); Keyes v.
Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973) (reaffirming prohibition on use of race conscious remedies to
eliminate de facto segregation); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment
of Japanese-Americans); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (upholding denial of women's right to
vote); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (reaffirming the constitutionality of slavery); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (divesting indigenous Americans of titles to land).
163
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316.
164
Id.
165
Kurland, supra note 27, at 184.
166 Immigr. & Natrualization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (striking down the legislative
veto mechanism as a violation of separation of powers).
159

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017

23

Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
Do Not Delete

286

4/29/18 8:45 AM

RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI:iii

Though this article establishes that the Judiciary holds policymaking
power, it has yet to ask if courts should embrace and exercise that power.
The Court has, perhaps unsuccessfully, tried to answer the question:
A judgment as to when the evil of a decisional error exceeds the evil of
an innovation must be based on very practical and in part upon policy considerations. When, as in this problem, such practical and political judgments
can be made by the political branches of the government, it is the part of
wisdom and self-restraint and good government for courts to leave the initiative to Congress.169
In constitutional interpretation, the Judiciary may find itself pondering
the fitness of a particular executive order or piece of legislation, and whether or not and/or how to appraise the validity and desirability of said legal
pronouncement:
Policy must inevitably be considered by the court where no other compelling
bases of decisions are indicated. Just as laymen, when confronted by a novel
problem will, and, indeed, must consider the matter in relation to what ‘ought’
to be, so judges, unless bound by precedent or subject to clear legislative direction, must take into account the "rightness" of the decision in terms of the social, political or economic ends sought to be advanced. Only to the extent that
some external restriction which the judge deems himself bound to recognize
exists is his freedom in this particular curtailed.170

This formulation provides little in the form of concrete limitations, because a judge is able to exercise a high level of freedom to determine what
is constraining, and, thus, engage in policymaking regarding interpretation
of what is desirable.171 Viewing the Judiciary as part of a larger system in
which it is countered, balanced, and checked by the Executive and Legislative Branches helps situate the content and character of the courts’ power to
manipulate CAB and SOP.172 In this way, systems analysis enhances the aptitude of one “to expand . . . understanding of [the constitutional system’s]
behavior and properties.” Court opinions are interpretations that seek to
173

Bowsher v. Synar, 462 U.S. 714, 732–36 (1986) (striking down the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act as an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power by Congress).
168
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding the federal sentencing guidelines
against several separation of powers challenges).
169
United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 594 (1944).
170
Nutting, supra note 20, at 66.
171
See, e.g., Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 533; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235–37
(1941); Phelps-Dodge Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 313 U.S. 177 (1941); United States v. Local
807, 315 U.S. 521 (1942); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
172
See J. B. Ruhl, Law's Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 904 (2008) (“A system may
be stable and predictable over some relevant time frame and scale, but it is never entirely static, and
small changes in one condition can lead over time to large changes in another condition.”).
173
Id. at 888.
167
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provide answers that are “part of a much larger network or system of questions and answers and further questions instead of being merely discrete
self-contained units of information.”174 As mentioned, behavior within any
system does not take place in a vacuum, and in the case of constitutional interpretation, systemic factors, like CAB and SOP, arise from the interaction
of the individual parts.175
For the Judiciary and from a systems perspective, policy not only reflects
the values, norms, content and character of the interpreter, but also more
importantly reflects the political and legal super-structure that informs policymaking.176 “The behavior of the system as a whole can never be understood by mechanistically adding together its component parts . . . the economy and society . . . are more than the sum of the individuals who inhabit
it.”177 This is especially true when considering the Judiciary's function and
the function of its opinions within the system.178 In Warth v. Seldin, the
Court states, “In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. This inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal court
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. In both dimensions, it
is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the
courts in a democratic society.”179 By considering the function of the Judiciary within a complex system, we see that it serves the overarching needs
and values of the constitutional order as a whole.180 Thus, by identifying
systemic factors and actors, one is better able to study the Constitution and
its impact on law and society. In turn, this understanding impacts the form
and substance of constitutional interpretation and identifies overarching pat-

174

DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, OBLIVION: STORIES 131 (2004).
See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (finding the Line Item Veto Act of
1996 unconstitutionally delegated power to the Executive to unilaterally amend or repeal parts of statutes passed by Congress); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (finding Congress may
not retroactively require the federal courts to reopen final judgments, because it violates separation of
powers); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1988) (upholding the independent counsel statute
against separation of powers challenges); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986) (finding an administrative agency may, in some cases, exert jurisdiction over state law counterclaims).
176
Spann, supra note 145, at 746–47 (“[The] normative values and political preferences are constitutionalized through Supreme Court opinions that purport to demonstrate how the Court's outcomes flow logically from the language, structure, and original intent of the Constitution.”).
177
PAUL ORMEROD, BUTTERLY ECONOMICS: A NEW GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL & ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR X (2000).
178
Leflar, supra note 113, at 736–37.
179
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (discussing the issue of standing and the proper role of the
courts in hearing cases and controversies).
180
See id. at 517–18 (discussing the “threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention”).
175
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terns that emerge when considering the systemic nature of the Constitution.181
B. The Impact of the Executive & Legislature on the Judiciary
A systems view also enables one to better assess the many factors that inform constitutional interpretation and how a judicial opinion will be impacted by and impact the systemic realities of the polity. From this perspective, the
rule of checks and balances inherent in the system of separation of powers provides Justices (and all other governmental actors) with separate actions of the
branches of government but from the interaction among them. Thus, it follows
that for any set of actors to make authoritative policy be they Justices, legislators, or executives—they must take into account this institutional constraint by
formulating expectations about the preferences of the other relevant actors and
what they expect them to do when making their own choices.182

What is more, in
[in] the social world . . . causation is complex. Outcomes are determined not by
single causes but by multiple causes, and the causes may, and usually do, interact, in a non-additive fashion . . . the combined effect is not necessarily the sum
of the separate effects. . . . complex causes can [thus] easily generate chaotic
outcomes.183

In this way, judicial interpretation is comprised of manifold layers of
networked systems of knowledge and understanding that inform policy
formulation and implementation based on the courts’ interpretation of the
Constitution.
In Allen v. Wright, for instance, the plaintiffs, parents of AfricanAmerican children in seven states where public schools had recently been
181

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (“In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on
all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a
will of its own. . . .It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive
magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for
defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must
be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights
of the place.”).
182
Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 593–94.
183
BYRNE, supra note 35, at 20 (1998); see also Fritjof Capra, Complexity and Life, EMERGENCE 15, 21–
23 (June 1, 2002) (discussing “chaos theory”).
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desegregated, brought a class action suit against the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") contending that its guidelines and procedures for determining
whether private schools were racially discriminatory, and subsequent denial
of tax-exempt status to such schools, were insufficient.184 Plaintiffs contended that the IRS standards used to determine discrimination were not accurately identifying private school discrimination, and that white parents
were able to send their children to private schools and deduct charitable
contributions to the institution, thereby perpetuating segregated schools.185
The Court determined that citizens do not have standing to sue a federal
agency based only on the adverse effects that the agency’s determinations
might have on third parties. The Court stated that,
The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why
our cases preclude the conclusion that respondents’ alleged injury ‘fairly can be
traced to the challenged action’ of the IRS. That conclusion would pave the
way generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government
violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out
their legal obligations. . . . ‘Carried to its logical end, [respondents’] approach
would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom
and soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress,
acting through its committees and the 'power of the purse;' it is not the role of
the judiciary, absent actual present or immediately threatened injury resulting
from unlawful governmental action.’186

In Allen, the plaintiff’s sought to have the courts appreciate and act upon
the socially discriminatory effects of IRS tax policy enabling what Justice
Stevens alluded to as government policy subsidizing white-flight.187 He
wrote, “In final analysis, the wrong respondents allege that the Government
has committed is to subsidize the exodus of white children from schools
that would otherwise be racially integrated.”188 The Court chose systemic
principles embodied in CAB and SOP over competing, social policymotivated ones to decide the case at hand.189
Within the system, the Judiciary will, generally speaking, uphold CAB
and SOP over competing norms, values, and ordering principles.190 While
this may not be something that is embraced explicitly by the Judiciary, it is
184

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
Id. at 783–84 (Stevens J., dissenting).
186
Id. at 759–60.
187
See id. at 784 (Stevens J., dissenting).
188
Id.
189
See Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (“We could not recognize respondents’ standing in this case without running afoul of that structural principle.”).
190
See id. at 760 (1984) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976)) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)).
185
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present in the overarching constitutional order. For example,
191

When the Constitution fixes the boundaries of the three departments in terms of
their basic functions, it inevitably locates in the judiciary the authority to assert
itself as the guardian of the principle of the separation of powers. . . . Its judgment affects the balance between the executive and legislative branches and
generally defines the conditions under which they must operate in relation to
the Constitution as viewed by the court.192

Thus, opinions become “discrete, chronological series of moments” that
establish a corpus of truth based on knowledge that the courts apply and obtain through the interpretive process.193 In addition, the power of judicial review functions as a form of policymaking even if that power is specifically
premised on cabining the power aspirations of the competing branches.194
The “power of judicial review specifically to cabin each branch within its
constitutional limits, lest each arrogate to itself more than its entitlement” is
a form of policy that explicitly encapsulates the Judiciary's systemic policy
function to preserve the system’s integrity via CAB and SOP.195 Thus, preserving the integrity of the overarching constitutional system is a cardinal
role that the courts assume in constitutional interpretation:
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal
Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial,
to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine
itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each
of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power even to accomplish desirable objectives must be resisted. Although not ‘hermetically’ sealed
from one another, the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally
identifiable.196

191

See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). (“If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will
afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so
much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance
of so arduous a duty. This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and
the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which,
though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in
the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.”); see also Alan Dershowitz, Courts Check and Balance Trump on Immigration, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 9, 2017, 10:10 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Courts-check-andbalance-Trump-on-immigration-481106.
192
Santos, supra note 117, at 568.
193
WALLACE, supra note 174, at 151.
194
See Malcolm T. Dungan, The Supreme Court as a Court of Law, 6 J. PUB. L. 363 (1957).
195
Kurland, supra note 27, at 189.
196
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.

https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol21/iss3/4

28

Astrada: The Nature of the Judicial Process: A Complex Systems Analysis of
Do Not Delete

2018]

4/29/18 8:45 AM

NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

291

This system constitutes a bounded, complex, and rule-based space for the
ordering of national political and legal affairs.197
Ultimately, a complex systems approach to judicial interpretation inherently involves the interaction of the Judiciary with the Executive and Legislative Branches, as well as State governments and courts.198 For example, “It
is within Congress’s power to overturn the interpretations the Court gives to
statutory law but, according to the Supreme Court, it is not—at least not by
a simple majority—within Congress’s power to overturn the Court's constitutional decisions; Congress must propose a constitutional amendment.”199
In Dickerson v. United States the Court declared that a constitutional decision of the Court cannot be overruled by an act of Congress.200 The Court
enunciated CAB and SOP while clarifying its role in the constitutional order finding that it
has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority
to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals.
However, the power to judicially create and enforce non-constitutional ‘rules of
procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a
relevant Act of Congress.’ Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or
set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution. But Congress may not legislatively supersede our
decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.201

As such, within the complex constitutional system, the three Branches interact and coevolve. 202 Justice Holmes’ observations of the law in the 19th
century readily apply in the 21st century. He writes,
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public
policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.203

In general, a system is composed of regularly interacting parts that give
rise to systemic activities. “The [Judiciary] is an essential part of the political leadership and possesses some bases of power of its own, the most important of which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of

197

See id. at 942–44.
Dahl, supra note 87, at 580–81.
199
Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 596.
200
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
201
Id. at 437.
202
Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 592.
203
HOLMES, supra note 23, at 1.
198

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017

29

Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
Do Not Delete

4/29/18 8:45 AM

292

RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI:iii

the Constitution,”204 and demonstrates that a set of concepts, whether empirical, metaphysical, or philosophical, works in tandem within an interdependent set of organizational relationships.205
As such, four general elements characterize the role of the Judiciary in
the larger political, economic, and sociocultural system within which the
constitutional order functions:
First, there are the propositions or principles allegedly derived from constitutional or statutory language; second, judicial precedents which, these days, are
more likely to refer to lengthy obiter dicta rather than holdings in previous cases; third, the practicalities of the situation which license or inhibit the scope of
judicial adventurism; and finally, and not least, the personal predilections of
each of the judges, for it must be understood that, in Hamiltonian terms, the judiciary now exerts WILL as well as JUDGMENT if not yet FORCE. Each of
the four elements, separately or in combination, may be subsumed under
the
rubric of public policy.206

Constitutional interpretation is comprised of complex, interactive agents
that provide the Judiciary with the potential to adapt and learn from eventuation, because the constitutional order is not a collection of agents and
components, but rather a system.207 The difference between a “collection”
and a “system” (whose parts are comprised of multiple sub-systems), as explained by Bertalanffy, is “that in a collection the parts remain individually
unchanged whether they are isolated or together . . . whereas in a system the
parts necessarily become changed by their mutual association; hence, their
whole becomes more than just the sum of the parts.”208 Focusing on fixed
structures or aspects of constitutional interpretation, though indispensable to
explaining and understanding constitutional law, is too narrow, because it
posits a closed system with various laws that apply across the board.209 A
systems analysis approach is better suited to explaining and understanding
the judicial power, because it involves “a way of thinking having the proportions of a world view . . . as opposed to singular principles or parts of a
structure.”
210
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While constitutional interpretation may seem to take place in a closed
system,211 it is a complex and open system that is in constant flux and comprised of various constituent ideational and material components.212 Constitutional interpretation founded on CAB and SOP is a complex attribute of a
system that networks the Judiciary into the larger policymaking apparatuses
of the constitutional order.213 Fundamentally, processes “of complex organization have to be understood in evolutionary terms: they cannot be atomistically reduced to, or deduced from, their components. The whole is bigger
than the sum of the parts, a whole which becomes ever more diversified,
qualitatively evolving towards greater complexity.”214
CONCLUSION
This article highlights the importance of viewing the judicial power from
a systems perspective, which directly informs the nature of the judicial process and the structure wherein the administration of justice takes place. In
sum, system and structure matter when seeking to explain and understand
judicial power, because both have an indelible effect on the nature of the
judicial process and on the outcomes of the interpretive enterprise. From a
complex systems perspective, judicial power reflects the political and philosophical principle that “there can be no government of laws without a balance, and that there can be no balance without three orders [(Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial)]: and that even three orders can never balance
each other, unless each in its department is independent and absolute.”215
Thus, the Judiciary plays a key role in the administration of justice as envi211
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sioned by the structural principles embedded in the Constitution, such as the
separation of powers and checks and balances. In Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, the Court declared that the judiciary “has no will.”216 It continued,
Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. . . . Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the
judge, always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or,
in other words, to the will of the law.217

By employing a systems analysis, we can observe that this is not exactly
the case, because the nature of the judicial process and the overarching constitutional order are both impacted by the norms and values encapsulated in
CAB and SOP.218 For instance, the courts are likely to exert leadership in
national policymaking when a dominant coalition is weak or is unstable
with respect to key policies. Likewise, the courts may participate in national
policymaking within the narrow limits set by the basic policy goals of the
dominant coalition, or the may be most effective when they set policy for
officials, agencies, state governments, or regions.219
Systemically, the constitutional order’s prerogative is “to preserve the
principle of checks and balances without which no form of government can
attain any permanency.”220 CAB and SOP thus play a fundamental role in
judicial interpretation, because each signifies or reflects “a body of beliefs
that express the fundamental, largely unconscious or assumed political values of a society.”221 The nature of the judicial process leads to the production
of knowledge and understanding that legitimates, maintains, enhances, and
preserves the integrity of the overarching constitutional order.222 Systemic
analysis is, therefore, germane to constitutional theory building, because, as
Gaetano Mosca notes, “a person thinks, judges and believes the way a society in which he lives thinks, judges and believes.”223
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demanded values.”).
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